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THE PERUVIAN APRISTA PARTY AND APRISMO:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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No. 1725/66

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

THE PERUVIAN APRISTA PARTY AND APRISMO: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

(22 June 1966)

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Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence

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We must be wary of Aprista Party changes of opinion....the party was anti-Yankee in 1930, pro-Yankee in 1945, defended the oligarchy in 1956, and now in 1966 it becomes anti-imperialist to recruit followers.

--- Statement of an anti-Aprista
Peruvian Congressman, May 1966

The policy of the national reformist leaders toward imperialism detracts from the influence and popularity of their parties. What has a particularly disastrous effect on /the "national reformist" parties/ is their anti-communism. The frankly pro-imperialist APRA party in Peru, officially allied to the extreme right Odría group, probably furnishes the most striking indication of the drift of the national reformist parties.

--- Latin American Institute, the
Academy of Sciences, USSR, from
"Political Parties in Latin
America," World Marxist Review,
August 1965

THE PERUVIAN APRISTA PARTY AND APRISMO: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

I. Introduction

The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) was founded in 1924 by the Peruvian Victor Raul Haya de la Torre to launch a political-economic program applicable to all of Latin America. Aprismo, as the international doctrine is styled, in its early years gained widespread popularity among leftist groups and intellectuals. Among other things, it called for political unification of Latin America as a means of combatting the overweening economic and political influence of the United States. Although the APRA also envisaged the establishment of affiliated parties in each of the twenty countries of the area to promote its goals, the Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP) is the only surviving national organization of the movement.

Aprismo and the programs of the PAP are tending to be anachronisms in the political life of the hemisphere. Both the national and international facets of Aprismo have evolved to such a degree that they are scarcely recognizable when compared with the original "purist" forms. The number one dogma, calling for "action against Yankee imperialism," has been diluted beyond recognition and long since preempted by Communist and pro-Communist groups. Other aspects of Aprismo have been taken up or perhaps even plagiarized by more recent political movements, but without enhancing the stature of APRA.

The PAP still performs part-time as the authentic spokesman of the "indo-American"*features of Aprismo, rather than in the role of a true national party, concentrating on Peruvian domestic issues. Yet it no longer has an unchallenged monopoly in Peru as the only party with a mass base and with "programs and principles." The PAP now faces serious competition from the left in addition to its traditional enemy, the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), and its inflexible opponents among the armed forces and the powerful rightist elite.

*A term specially devised by APRA to replace the allegedly erroneous designation "Latin America." It emphasizes the native or Indian element of the population of the area.

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Perennially frustrated in its attempts to win power via the electoral path, the PAP has managed to retain its legal status during the past decade, a major achievement for an organization which had enjoyed such a position for only four of the first twenty-six years of its existence. It is now struggling to keep its place as the strongest single party in the nation. The combined weight of tradition, tight discipline, a rooted organization, and program appeal seems to ensure the PAP a major role in Peruvian political life into the foreseeable future. But the odds may be less favorable for the party's prospects of winning power via the ballot than they were in 1962, when the military intervened to nullify Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre's slight plurality in the presidential election. Many contingencies could sharply improve this outlook, but others equally plausible are just as likely to worsen it.

The party's future, like its past, is intimately linked with Haya who has provided the thread of internal unity, international prestige, and an enduring quality of personalismo. If the Jefe runs for the presidency in 1969, it is questionable whether he will be any more acceptable to the armed forces at that time than he has been in the past. A similar cloud will surround any other Aprista candidate and it is doubtful that a definitive answer on the military response can be obtained even just before the election.

Apart from this critical factor, the PAP, which has maintained a continuous battle with the PCP, has an unusual quality as a catalyst for the heterogeneous opposition of the left and right, which is united solely in a common hatred of Haya, the party, and Aprismo. In addition, the price of legality and overt participation in politics has been high, and the charge to internal party unity may not yet have been paid: many Apristas and sympathizers seem to feel that the PAP has seriously compromised its principles and idealism through the political tactics and deals into which it has entered since 1956. However, serious dissension has not yet erupted--and probably will not as long as Haya is in command.

The irony of APRA's destiny as well as that of the PAP is to have been born about twenty years too soon. Most of its doctrines and programs would not seem extremist by present standards. In other words, Aprismo was born before

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the acceptance of the "popular parties of the democratic left," and especially before the fundamental social, economic, and political reform principles were set forth in the Alliance for Progress and adopted--at least in theory--as common policy for the hemisphere.

With its strong leadership, anti-Communist orientation, and the present relatively moderate Peruvian domestic programs, the PAP could well have become a kind of prototype of all that was desirable in a progressive political organization. But the PAP was not born in the 1950's and thus far has been unable to divest itself of the frustrating political impediments connected with its past.

II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE APRA, APRISMO, AND THE PAP.

The APRA was founded in 1924 by Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre as the regional political organization to promote a five-point "Maximum Program" for all of Indo-America. Haya, whose career as an internationalist, philosopher, writer, and politician, is virtually synonymous with the APRA, and other Peruvian founders of the movement envisioned the formation of Aprista affiliates in each Latin American nation with distinctive "Minimum Programs" adapted to the special local conditions. The minimum program of each country was nevertheless expected to mesh with, and foster, the long-range common goals of Aprismo, the name used to identify the collective doctrine and programs of the APRA. The Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP), which has also been known as the Party of the People, is the only viable political organization in the hemisphere spawned by the APRA and today is the sole spokesman of Aprismo, which has consequently remained essentially Peruvian in character. Although the APRA wielded considerable influence over leftist intellectual and political leaders in various countries in the two decades after its founding, its appeal and inspirational strength have faded considerably in subsequent years. Other hemispheric movements of more recent vintage, which have possibly borrowed from Aprismo, have tended to replace it in hemispheric political ideology; for example, the justicialista program of former dictator Perón of Argentina; "third-force" and neutralist doctrines, and the Latin American versions of Christian Democracy.

The APRA's origins and inspiration were derived in part from the Argentine university reform movement centered in Córdoba in 1918; in part from precursor intellectuals and iconoclasts, like the Peruvian Manuel González Prada; and especially from feudalistic Peruvian political and social conditions. Haya and other "radical" student leaders in Peru initiated a nationalistic protest movement against those conditions, particularly the depressed state of the Indian segment of the population and the absolute monopoly of political, social and economic power by the numerically small upper class. At the outset, the leadership was almost exclusively composed of student intellectuals but it was soon reinforced by the incipient Peruvian organized labor movement. Violent methods were employed to challenge the authority of the dictatorship of Augusto Leguía (1919-1930) which in turn reacted with repressive countermeasures.

The "heroic" generation of intellectual and labor leaders of the early 1920's in Peru have retained control of the PAP and its policies to the present time. In addition to Haya, the party "Jefe," these included Ramiro Priale, Andrés Townsend, Arturo Sabroso, Manuel Cox, Fernando León de Vivero, Luis Heyesen, Luis Alberto Sánchez, and, until his recent death, Manuel Seoane. The dominant "old Aprista guard" is old in years as well as tenure: Haya has passed his 71st birthday and most of the others are well into their 60's.

The APRA and Aprismo

The APRA was formally established in 1924 in Mexico City, where Haya resided as an exile. In the years which followed, various short-lived Aprista affiliates or "cells" were founded in Mexico, Cuba, Argentina, Costa Rica, and other parts of Latin America. But not until 1930 was the PAP organized in Lima.

During the years 1924-1931, Haya traveled widely--in the United States, Western Europe, Russia, and China. He came in contact with many leading political, scientific, and intellectual figures of the times and studied first-hand the doctrines and workings of contemporary political movements and programs. The leaders with whom he associated included such notables as Albert Einstein, Jose Vasconcellos, Arnold Toynbee, Trotsky, Bukharin, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Romain Rolland, Harold Lasky, and Clement Atlee. Eventually he attracted intellectual admirers and supporters in the United States and throughout Latin America. Haya was particularly influenced by the theory of relativity, the programs and progress of the Mexican Revolution, Marxist theory and the Russian form of Communism, the political beliefs of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Italian fascism, New Deal Programs, and British socialism. The doctrine, ideas, and symbolism of these leaders and movements were adapted and incorporated in varying degrees into Haya's philosophy of Aprismo, as presented in his own voluminous writings, those of other Peruvian Aprista leaders, and many intellectuals who interpreted the meaning and significance of APRA. The result was a strange melange moulded into Haya's special "Indo-American" historical concepts, which he projected for all the countries south of the Rio Grande.

The PAP in Peruvian Political Life (1931 to present)

The PAP, which was not founded until 1930, is intimately enmeshed--and seemingly encumbered--by its own history. Haya returned to Peru in 1931 after many years of foreign travel and study to become the new party's first presidential candidate in the elections in September of that year. The PAP held its first national congress just prior to the balloting and adopted a detailed "minimum program" for Peru which called for comprehensive and detailed social, political, administrative, and economic reforms. The program in fact was a kind of precursor of the principles embodied in the Alliance for Progress, but too advanced for its day and particularly for the ultra-conservative political milieu in Peru.

It is generally recognized that Haya won a clear electoral victory in 1931 over General Luis Sánchez Cerro, the official candidate, and that the final count was manipulated to deprive him of office. Shortly thereafter, the famous Aprista uprising in Trujillo--Haya's birthplace and "cradle" of Aprismo--took place in protest of the electoral fraud. Aprista rebels decimated the military garrison in the city and the armed forces retaliated harshly. Large numbers of Apristas were massacred or executed en masse in reprisal or in the process of quelling the revolt. These incidents are the root cause of the enduring hostility between the PAP and the Peruvian armed forces--a religion of hatred which is kept burning by indoctrination of the officer corps and through annual commemoration of the military martyrs in the Trujillo uprising.

Outlawed between 1931 and 1945, the PAP was the principal element in the electoral victory of the National Democratic Federation which backed the presidential candidacy of José Luis Bustamante in the elections of the latter year. The PAP exercised its major role in national government during this administration, holding as many as three key cabinet posts for a period, commanding a near majority in the Congress, and dominating the municipal councils throughout the country.

The Aprista record in sharing government responsibility was characterized in large degree by a major effort to expand the party's influence at all levels of government, rather than to press for some of the reforms which it had advocated. The Aprista element in the coalition constantly challenged President Bustamante (1945-48) and his minority following for domination of the executive branch. Apristas in government blindly followed

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the instructions of Haya rather than those of the President, placing first priority on the parochial objectives of the PAP. Many considered Haya to be the true president of the country during most of this administration.

The Apristas were also guilty of various blunders in dealing with the obstructionist political opposition, including the failure on one occasion to support a no-confidence motion against the minister of government and police (Manuel Odría). They consequently missed the opportunity to remove their future nemesis from office. Periodic use of violence, strikes, and strong-arm tactics also tended to reinforce a widespread belief that the PAP was subversive in its methods. The short-lived period of legal status and the experiment in PAP-supported coalition came to an end in October 1948 when Aprista elements became involved in--if they were not the instigators of--a brief naval revolt at Callao. Bustamante outlawed the party shortly before a military coup headed by Odría ousted him from office. In the period which followed the PAP was forced to operate underground again; the leaders were persecuted; and Haya served his famous five-year asylum in the Colombian Embassy in Lima (January 1949 - April 1954). This incident became an international cause célèbre, which was twice submitted to the International Court of Justice at the Hague for adjudication, and centered considerable publicity on both the Jefe and the PAP.

The PAP regained legality once more in 1956 as partial payment for its support of the presidential candidacy of Manuel Prado in the elections of that year. Prado's Democratic Pradista Movement (MDP), which represented a segment of the oligarchy and upper middle class, obtained the PAP's electoral favor only after a close competition for Aprista aid with the political organization backing the official candidate of the Odría regime. Many Aprista supporters viewed this arrangement, known as the convivencia ("living together") as a serious compromise of party principles. The PAP agreed not only to lend its voting strength to Prado but also to provide qualified cooperation with his administration (if elected), in exchange for legal status, a general amnesty, permission for Haya to return to Peru, and the promise of municipal elections.

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Since 1956, the PAP has tended to move toward further moderation in its program and tactics; has generally refrained from violence; and has sought to win greater respectability among the public and particularly among its implacable enemies of the center and right. However, these efforts were not successful in gaining military acceptance of Haya's slight plurality in the three-way presidential election in 1962, in which both Fernando Belaunde and Manuel Odría were close competitors. The elections were nullified by military intervention; and in June, 1963, exactly one year later, Belaunde succeeded in winning a small plurality in a re-run of the same electoral contest. Although Belaunde's Popular Action (AP) in coalition with the Christian Democrats was supported by the Communists and advocated a program more leftist than that of the PAP, Belaunde and his party nevertheless were acceptable to the armed forces. This fact illustrates the depth of animosity and suspicion between Haya and the PAP on the one hand and the military leaders on the other. In 1962, the military would not even countenance Odría's assumption of office through Aprista support in the Congress, which must confirm a plurality candidate with less than one-third of the total vote.

Since Belaunde's term began, the PAP and the National Odrista Union (UNO), the party of former president Odría, have maintained a congressional and general political alliance or working agreement which gives these two parties control of Congress. This control has exerted considerable influence over the Belaunde administration and stands as a potential challenge to the supremacy of the executive under the present constitutional system.

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III. THE EVOLUTION OF APRISTA DOCTRINES AND PROGRAMS

The doctrine of Aprismo has been altered substantially since it was initially conceived. The evolution consistently has been toward moderation. The PAP's enemies and disaffected Peruvian Apristas have repeatedly charged that the movement has abandoned its basic ideology and even "sold out to Yankee imperialism." Haya and other leaders have defended Aprismo by asserting that it is not a static doctrine; that US policies have changed; that Communist imperialism and other new forces affecting Latin America have modified conditions during the past decades; and that PAP goals and ideals remain essentially unchanged. Whatever the rationale, the striking metamorphosis of Aprismo and the PAP is an undeniable political fact which bears on the present and future of both.

Aprismo as International Doctrine

The "Maximum Program" of APRA, proclaimed by Haya in Mexico City in 1924 and designed for the entire hemisphere, contained five major points: 1) action against Yankee imperialism; 2) the political unification of Latin America; 3) nationalization of land and industry; 4) internationalization of the Panama Canal; and 5) solidarity with all oppressed peoples in the world. The "Minimum Programs" of Aprista national affiliates were to promote these ultimate inter-American goals. Considered radical for their day, the objectives are also partly utopian.

The five points provide only a superficial synthesis of the elaborate philosophical and historical premises presented in the voluminous literature of Aprista intellectuals in the years after 1924 to explain and advertise the program. These collective writings converted Aprismo into a species of mystical political religion for Latin American leftists. Haya was recognized as the prophet and was the principal contributor.

The cornerstone of the dogma is Haya's philosophical "historical-space-time" concept, which at times is abstruse and esoteric. It bears the pronounced influence, inter alia, of the theory of relativity and Marxism, including its dialectical method and interpretation of history.

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The theory has features which are closely related to practical aspects of Aprismo and its relationship to Communism. Haya rejected the terminology "New World" as an erroneous European legacy and similarly the European division of history into Ancient, Medieval, and Modern periods. He stressed--and seemingly romanticized--the pre-Columbian civilizations of the hemisphere, the native races, and the Inca center in his native Peru as the essential cultural ingredient in Latin America. The Spanish-European civilization is considered an undigested and artificial superimposition on the basic Indian character of America, whose normal development was interrupted by the Conquest. The glories of the Inca Empire, the Inca system of land tenure, and social welfare practices are thus emphasized and have found a place in the PAP program for Peru. The terms "Pan-American," "Latin American," and "Spanish American," are considered inappropriate; the first because it signifies Yankee imperialism and domination; the second and third because they distort the true historical perspective of America by emphasizing the European. In substitution, Haya adopted the term "Indo-American" to describe the same geographic area.

Aprismo logically stresses the improvement of the Indian's status, his incorporation into modern life, and indeed his mental transformation in the process. Some of these precepts were influenced, though perhaps not inspired, by Haya's observation of the Mexican Revolutionary reform programs, which glorified the native race and concentrated considerable attention on promoting the material welfare of the Indian.

The political unification of Latin America, still a long-term goal of the PAP and Aprismo, is closely related to "action against Yankee imperialism" and also to Haya's historical concepts. Aprismo views the geographic division of the area into 20 nation-states as an unfortunate outgrowth of the Spanish colonial period. It looks toward the removal of these "artificial" boundaries to form, as Haya has written, "the Great Indo-Americana Fatherland" or "The United States of Indo-America." Only through such political unity and economic integration will the area be in a position to develop its true destiny and work out equitable relationships with the United States, which wields an

allegedly disproportionate and dominating power over Latin America. Indo-American citizenship, regional groupings of Latin American nations for political and economic cooperation and integration, customs unions, a central development bank, a Latin American parliament, and regional economic planning councils are some of the Aprista institutional proposals which will lead to a super constitution for the Great Indo-American Fatherland. Internationalization of the Panama Canal was also intended to further unity sentiment in the area, promote commercial integration, and force the United States to recognize an inherent "sovereign right" of Indo-America.

Proposed nationalization of land and industry reflected the strong Marxist, socialist, and statist influence on Aprismo economic doctrine in its formative years as well as the chauvinistic resentment against "Yankee economic imperialism." In addition, this point of the program illustrated in part the emphasis on the communal, cooperative, and social welfare practices of the Inca Empire.

International political and military developments and the practical experience and observations of Haya and other Apristas have wrought substantial modifications in Aprismo, especially since the late 1930's. Despite its heavy borrowing from Marxism-Leninism--for methods, phraseology, and economic doctrine--the APRA conflicted ideologically with the world Communist movement. Exclusively and peculiarly Latin American, Aprismo ipso facto challenged the basis of Marxism-Leninism, which assumed that its principles were universally applicable and provided solutions to all problems at all times, regional and national. While accepting the validity of the Marxist interpretation of Western European history in the 19th century and the application of Russian-style Communism, Haya expressly denied its suitability to the Latin American scene. For example, he asserted that imperialism was the first rather than the last stage of capitalism in the area; and he applied Marxist dialectic to Marxism-Leninism, indicating that Communism also bore the seeds of its own obsolescence and disappearance, at least in its 20th century mold.

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In the practical sphere, the PAP engaged in bitter conflict with the PCP for control of the Peruvian student and labor movements--a conflict which continues to the present day. The two groups even battled over which one could rightly claim as a founder the brilliant Marxist intellectual, José Carlos Mariátegui, who had served in this capacity for both parties. Finally, the Peruvian Apristas were well aware that the orthodox Communist parties in the hemisphere were blindly obedient to the dictates of Moscow, a subservience which ran afoul of the Indo-American regional thesis.

Over the course of time, Aprismo became less and less anti-American in orientation and increasingly rational and pragmatic in its policy toward the United States. Apristas first asserted that, although all imperialism was evil, the US version, unlike the Communist form, at least carried no totalitarian political straightjacket. The Good Neighbor Policy, the liquidation of direct US military intervention in the Caribbean, the struggle of the US and the Western Allies against the totalitarian powers in World War II, the subsequent cold war conflict between the West and the Communist bloc, APRA's reluctant recognition that foreign private capital had a necessary and positive rôle to play in Latin America--all these factors contributed toward APRA's elimination of the "Yankee" adjective from its program calling for "action against Yankee imperialism."

Haya, who has been described in his youth as a more rabid anti-Yankee than the most confirmed Communist, has himself radically changed his opinions of the United States. Both he and the PAP have been regarded as increasingly favorably disposed toward the US since the end of World War II. At least Aprismo's rigid anti-Americanism has long since faded into oblivion and has been transformed into a more or less conventional moderate-leftist position similar to that of other non-Communist parties of the left in Latin America.

This striking evolution is clearly demonstrated in a statement made by Haya in Mexico City for Life magazine in May 1954, a few weeks after the termination of his protracted asylum in the Colombian embassy in Lima. "I believe," he declared, "that democracy and capitalism offer the surest road toward a solution of world problems, even though capitalism still has its faults."

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Other aspects of the international program have similarly been muted or modified. About 1946, Aprismo substituted "inter-Americanization" for "internationalization" of the Panama Canal, but this proposal has been given little stress in recent years. The same is true of the plank calling for solidarity with all oppressed peoples. On the other hand, the PAP has attempted to rectify the widespread belief that Aprismo is fundamentally a class-ethnic doctrine; that is, designed largely for the pure Indian elements of the population. APRA denies this charge and Haya now highlights mestizaje (mixed or mestizo elements) as one of the great common bonds of Indo-America. The PAP further explains that the Indian is not emphasized in programs purely on ethnic grounds but only as one of the oppressed classes in Latin America, all of which Aprismo seeks to assist and uplift.

The "Minimum Program" of the PAP: Theory and Practice

The "minimum program" of the PAP was formulated in detail at the first party congress in 1931 and during the early years of the party's history. At least in theory, the initial general reform objectives remain intact. However, there have been modifications, different points of emphasis, a toning down of the phraseology, and even some abandonment of various aspects of the platform. In part the program appears far more moderate today because basic social, economic, and political reforms--so-called "structural changes" in society--are widely recognized in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America as desirable and even inevitable; in part, because state intervention in the economies and actual management of varied economic activities have advanced rapidly throughout much of the area since the 1930's. Thus, the Aprista state capitalist theory no longer carries the radical connotation of former times.

The PAP appears to have abandoned many of its early fundamental principles in its long pursuit of governmental power. From the standpoint of the party's current propaganda lines, the program at present is streamlined and simplified. The party no longer stresses the innumerable specific goals and means to achieve them as incorporated in the early "minimum program." Whether some of these features have been shelved in anticipation of eventually winning governmental power

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or quietly eliminated altogether is not clear; but in view of the PAP's experience in government during the Bustamente administration and as a legal party since 1956, the latter is probably the more accurate estimate. Certainly pragmatism has been a sobering influence on the "heroic generation" of Apristas and some of their early utopian goals.

General Aspects--The program of the 1930's for Peru reflected the idealism of the zealous intellectuals who composed it. The party set forth a kind of crusading, moralistic code for members to follow in personal and professional life and projected the cause of Aprismo as a kind of quasi-religion. The PAP was not designed to win control of government for the exercise of power per se, but to establish an institutionalized mechanism to achieve the party's objectives. The Spanish-Indian cultural dichotomy which had existed in Peru since the days of the Conquest was to be blended into a single Indo-American unity. The inner consciousness and presumably values of the Indian were to be transformed through material assistance of various kinds and education, and the Indian element of the population was thus to be gradually incorporated into the new life of the nation. Peru was to look inward and backward to its own history to find the uniquely Peruvian solutions to its problems. The slavish habit of copying European and North American models--a habit considered responsible for many of the nation's ills--was to be exorcised.

Political and Administrative Reforms--Borrowing a fascist concept, the PAP proposed a unicameral congress along functional lines with workers, peasants, artisans, managers, professional, and other classes represented, as distinct from the traditional geographic representation in the Peruvian assembly. The armed forces and police were to be strictly limited to an apolitical role and were to participate in building public works in order to contribute positively to social and economic development goals. The government was to be decentralized and extensive powers lodged in local and regional governmental bodies, especially municipalities. The same process would also apply to the nation's police and security forces.

Administrative reforms included a merit civil service system; public declarations of wealth by

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elected officials on taking office and investigations of their personal holdings at the time of retirement; and independent judiciary; and sharply graduated income, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes--in substitution of taxes on consumption--to effect a rapid, equitable redistribution of income.

Economic--The PAP proposed an economic system which it defined as a form of "state capitalism," rejecting on rather vague arguments the labels of Marxism, Communism, and socialism for this aspect of its program. The state was to dominate or play the major role in planning, development, financing, production, and distribution; ultimately it was to manage all the major economic sectors--that is, when the "Aprista state" had been constructed. Mining and transportation were to be nationalized immediately after the PAP had consolidated its governmental power, while other sectors were to come under state operation more gradually. Foreign private capital, which the PAP in its early years denounced in phrases which could scarcely be distinguished from Communist propaganda attacks, was to be subject to close supervision by the state. Such capital was to operate in Peru only so long as it proved beneficial to the national interests and retained the blessing of the state. On the other hand, the economic program did not advocate outright confiscation or wholesale expropriation of private enterprise, foreign or domestic. Nor was the elimination of the private sector expressly contemplated even after the millennium of the "Aprista state" had arrived.

A National Economic Congress, composed of functional representatives from economic classes, was to be convened soon after the PAP came to power to survey national economic and population resources and then to develop a master plan for economic development. Regional congresses with similar local composition were also to be established to assist in the planning and ultimately to implement the economic design. Agrarian reform with a basic redistribution of land was to be a major part of the economic transformation.

The Indian Program--In addition to the general objectives listed above, the PAP set forth detailed reforms to assist and defend the Indians, including legislation to protect the communal landholdings,

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prevent their alienation to third parties, and restore others which had been transferred; education, health, and other social aid; support of agrarian production and distribution through cooperatives; bilingual instruction for Indian children; and special campaigns to eliminate the use of coca leaves and alcohol by the Indians.

Other--In addition, the program comprehended legislation to protect and promote the interest of the working classes. This would include social welfare and education programs, such as free compulsory education for all of school age, the absolute separation of church and state, and the limitation of the church to the performance of strictly religious functions.

Since the PAP regained legal status in 1956, its attention has been directed toward elections, parliamentary maneuvers, specific political issues confronting the government, and other mundane political matters. Specifically, the Apristas have conducted a concerted campaign for a powerful-to-dominant legislative branch and a concomitantly weakened executive--a tactic closely tied to their strong representation in the Congress. There has been little clarification of the party's doctrine and theory during this period.

In at least three spheres, however, the PAP has in practice altered its position in relation to the "minimum program" of the 1930's. First, it generally follows a friendly or fairly rational line toward the United States and hemispheric developments in which the United States is deeply involved. This does not mean, however, that the PAP is noncritical, sanguine, or even notably "pro-American" in its policy. The party, for example, joined the Latin American throng in denouncing US unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and frequently voices the standard Latin American "demands" that the United States grant the area a privileged trading position for its exports, including price supports to "compensate" for alleged underpricing of these commodities in relation to high costs of imported capital goods. It periodically calls for changes in the OAS to reduce alleged US domination of this organization and for the United States to remove the "imperialist" features of its policies in Latin America.

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Secondly, the PAP no longer advocates extensive nationalization of sectors of the Peruvian economy. For example, party policy calls at present for "gradual nationalization" of the principal US-owned oil company in Peru (IPC), a position which is relatively moderate considering the stand of various other political and pressure groups on this highly nationalistic issue. The IPC case further illustrates the sharp contrast to the party's proposed "immediate nationalization" of transportation and mining as appeared in the program of the 1930's.

Finally, the PAP has scaled down to practical size its efforts to promote the Aprismo goal envisioning the political unity of Latin America. Nevertheless, the party still endorses this objective as well as economic integration, and it attempts to arrogate all possible credit for movements in this direction, such as the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association. For example, it recently endorsed President Belaunde's proposal for a "Latin American Federation" as essentially a belated recognition of a time-honored Aprista concept.

The PAP also continues to be a promoter of various projects which potentially are designed to encourage multilateral political party cooperation, such as the meetings of the Latin American Parliament and of the "popular parties of the democratic left" in the hemisphere. The purpose is to serve the political unity goal of Aprismo. As late as January 1966, the PAP proposed the establishment of fraternal ties between the democratic parties in Latin America "with a profound sense of social justice," and the world organization of social democratic parties. At that time, it charged Haya with exploring the possibilities of holding a "Conference of Social Democratic Parties of the World" in Lima, under PAP auspices. Haya himself continues to play out his role as an internationalist, recently calling for a "joint hemisphere plan" and a "continental effort" to further economic development based on Latin America's unifying elements of language, religion, and "mestizoidism."

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IV. THE OUTLOOK: CONCRETE FACTORS AND CONTINGENCIES

Recent Political Tactics Affecting Party Strength

Having been outlawed for about 22 years of its 36-year history, the PAP has tended to concentrate its efforts on retaining the legal status it recovered in 1956; on erasing false or distorted public concepts about Aprismo, such as its alleged propensity to violence and radicalism; and on political tactics designed to win elections. The pursuit of these short-term goals has produced internal strains, apparently diluted the fervor of more radical, militant elements in the party, and partly contributed to the decline of Aprista labor and student support. It has also led to unnatural alliances between the party and some of its traditional enemies, including segments of the wealthy "oligarchy."

The convivencia ("living together") or modus vivendi between the PAP and President Manuel Prado (1956-62) and his small party was generally honored by the Apristas, who gave qualified support to his administration. However, the arrangement failed to win acceptance of the party among the higher ranking officers of the armed forces or to modify perceptibly the animosity of its rightist enemies. On the other hand, the PAP's room for opposition political maneuvering was severely limited during these years. The party did not share in executive responsibility, the spoils of office, or the achievements of the Prado regime. But a portion of the blame for many governmental problems and difficulties seemed to rub off on it, since it was recognized that the Aprista vote had won the victory for Prado in 1956. Moreover, to some Apristas and sympathizers, the convivencia was tantamount to prostitution of the party's sacrosanct principles. In other words, it was an alliance with a member of the oligarchy who represented a perpetuation of the feudalistic monopoly in Peru. The PAP's very existence, protracted struggles, and concomitant persecution were intimately linked with destroying that monopoly.

Prado fulfilled his promise under the convivencia to permit Haya's return from exile, but this concession proved to be a mixed blessing for the party. Haya's decision to run as the PAP presidential candidate in 1962

was a serious blunder. It virtually made military intervention inevitable and thus sealed off any small prospect that the party might reap the harvest of victory at the polls. Although any other choice for a party candidate might well have provoked the same intervention, military opposition to Haya was undoubtedly sharper than it was toward other leaders.

Moreover, the strong support for the candidacy of Fernando Belaúnde not only reflected widespread disenchantment among Apristas and sympathizers over the convivencia, but posed a unique threat to the PAP's previously unchallenged position as the largest and only mass-based party in Peruvian history. Finally, Prado's personalistic MDP disintegrated after the elections--as might have been anticipated--leaving the PAP without even this modicum of organized support from the right as a consolation prize.

The impact of the PAP's present political alliance with the National Odriista Union (UNO) on the party's future and especially the elections set for 1969 cannot at present be estimated with accuracy. However, the balance sheet could very well be adverse to the Apristas. Initially entered into after the elections of 1963, this arrangement has been expanded subsequently to comprehend broad parliamentary, electoral, and other political cooperation. On the other hand, the Apristas in alliance with the Odriistas in Congress are in a position to influence, frustrate, and obstruct the Belaúnde administration and its reform proposals, many of which, ironically have a strong Aprista flavor. Such actions could seriously erode the President's prestige and, in turn, the voting strength of his AP party. However, obstructionism without positive alternative measures by the Aprista-Odriista combination could also rebound against both of these groups and carries some risk of military intervention.

Possibly anticipating the collapse of former President Odría's highly personalistic UNO by 1969, the PAP possibly sees in the alliance an opportunity eventually to attract much of the UNO's voting strength to its own fold. If successful, such a tactic could provide the PAP with a slight majority or near majority at the time of the next elections. Whether Odría could--even if willing

--bequeath his present political support to the PAP is highly questionable. And he himself has shown no signs of a waning appetite for the presidency.

On the negative side, the PAP has more seriously compromised its "honor and principles" in the UNO alliance than in the convivencia, where legal status was at least a valuable and tangible quid pro quo for the party's vote. As a president, Odría was the symbol of the last era of persecution of Apristas and the Aprista-controlled labor organization. He personally was responsible for holding Haya a prisoner in his own country during Haya's asylum in the Colombian Embassy. Haya's authoritarian control over the party, his personal prestige, and the loyalty he commands within the Aprista leadership appear essential to contain the dissension in the PAP over the UNO partnership. For example, various Aprista elements of unknown strength are known to have favored a more logical, qualified cooperation with the Belaúnde government. In any event, the seeds of far more serious party dissension are sown and could well sprout in the event the UNO falls apart or otherwise fails to provide a substantial electoral benefit to the PAP.

Haya's Influence on Unity and Prospects

The PAP is one of the oldest organizations in Latin America to qualify as a true political party of the non-Communist left. It has displayed remarkable durability and vitality in the face of protracted and harsh persecution, including imprisonment and exile of its leaders. Under these conditions, the internal unity of the PAP is similarly unique.

Various factors account for both viability and unity. The PAP program and Aprismo doctrine go beyond the appeal of a conventional political movement to offer a code of living, a crusade, a humanistic "mission." The Apristas copied the trappings of fascism and, to a lesser extent, of Communism to inculcate dedication, discipline, and loyalty in the adherents. For example, Haya's large photograph is displayed prominently after the style of Mussolini in party headquarters throughout the country and on placards at political and ceremonial functions of the party. His title as "Jefe" is also reminiscent of Mussolini. In addition, the party has a flag, a song set to

the music of the Marseillaise, a salute, a credo for youth, and other quasi-national symbolism. At one time, the party apparatus included effective paramilitary elements known as "buffaloes" (goon squads) for intimidating political opponents and carrying out assignments similar to those of the counterpart "Brown Shirts."

The PAP's vertical, highly authoritarian organizational structure, with all real power centered in the Jefe, has been able to enforce strict discipline within party ranks at all levels down through the years. The top hierarchy, particularly Haya, has largely dictated party strategy, tactics, and program modifications, apparently with a minimum of internal party debate. During the Aprista-supported Bustamante administration, for example, Haya reportedly held signed resignations of all Apristas in government to facilitate his determination of party policy.

The party has been free of major threats to unity. The expulsion in 1959 of Luis de la Puente Uceda, late guerrilla leader and former head of the dissident APRA Rebelde (the Rebel APRA party)--a Castroite movement which is now called the Leftist Revolutionary Movement --was the first public break in the PAP in recent years. But the defection of De la Puente and his followers was not serious. Of course, individual leaders and intellectuals of prominence have deserted the party from time to time for varying reasons. Until his recent death, Manuel Seoane, one of the most capable and dynamic Aprista leaders, headed a strong faction within the party which frequently challenged Haya's directives or opposed party policies, such as the dilution of the anti-Yankee line. However, no person has been able to assume Seoane's "challenger" role since his death. Luis de las Casas Grieve, who displayed ambitions in this direction in 1964, has been subject to sharp and effective party discipline.

Thus, the PAP has combined the two key elements which make for a viable Latin American political organization: a program, a mission, and a past glorified by "martyrdom" in a struggle against authoritarian rule and privilege; and secondly, a dynamic, magnetic, powerful single leader with longevity.

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The key questions about the future of the PAP, including the maintenance of its unity, now hinge in large degree on Haya. The Jefe has not groomed an acceptable heir apparent nor even indicated his choice of successor or successors. The large national executive committee is still monopolized by the old names. The party does not seem to be preparing any dynamic, young leaders to enter top positions or become potential presidential candidates. Thus, the balance of power in the PAP in the post-Haya period defies an accurate prognostication. Even those ambitious leaders who may seek to unseat the ancien regime cannot be identified from information available at present.

The old "heroic" generation, bound together by common experience and loyalty to Haya, may eventually split among themselves in a contest for control of the party and its program after Haya's departure. It is more probable, however, that they will face mounting pressure from discontented elements of the middle and lower echelons who will demand a greater voice in the direction of the party.

Respect for Haya and his dictates has prevented any accurate measure of the level and seriousness of discontent in Aprista ranks. The PAP has in fact been a one-person party. Haya of course is only one element of party unity, but his demise will raise fundamental problems of leadership, organization, and orientation. The probable changes in the PAP could rock the foundations of its traditional discipline and cohesion.

The Next National Elections

The PAP's political outlook is not encouraging for 1969 in the event Haya is around, in good health, and controlling its destiny. The party will almost certainly feel saddled once more with his candidacy. Barring the possibility that he will see the light of Peruvian political realities in his twilight years, decline the nomination, and also leave the country, the PAP will again confront the dual obstacles of winning the necessary votes and overcoming the orientation of the armed forces. Of course, the latter development lies within the realm of the possible; but more likely the armed forces will

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seek to insure by indirect means that there will be no repetition of the 1962 election outcome and thus avoid involvement in another public crisis.

Even without Haya, the PAP will probably be a strong force on the Peruvian political scene in the foreseeable future. Its viability is thoroughly tested, in contrast to the late-comers of the "democratic left," such as the AP and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), neither of which has a strong organization or has demonstrated the ability to survive for any protracted period without sharing in the spoils of office. Belaúnde's AP in particular seems to be typical of the strongly personalistic party traditional to Latin America, and is likely to lose popularity with the exercise of power. Without a leader who can fill Belaúnde's shoes in 1969, it may be less of a challenge to the PAP at the time. However, the real question is whether leftists and rightists can get together on their common denominator of anti-Aprismo to thwart the Apristas at the polls.

~~Whatever the outcome of the future~~

Whatever the outcome of the future struggle for executive power, the PAP will probably continue to exercise considerable direct and indirect influence over government through its strong representation in Congress. As at present, it will probably continue to hold the largest bloc of deputies and senators of any single party, barring a major break in unity. Such influence is not to be discounted under the Peruvian constitution, which provides for interpellation of cabinet ministers and mandatory resignation after a vote of no-confidence. If frustrated in its long pursuit of the presidency in 1969, PAP will probably keep pressing for a form of parliamentary supremacy in Peru, even though experience with this form of government in Latin America has led to stagnation or chronic instability. The PAP used the lever of its near majority in Congress during the Aprista-backed Bustamante regime in a concerted effort to expand its control over government and dominate the executive. It is employing somewhat similar strategy against Belaúnde, and its current propaganda line stresses the superior role of the Congress.

Decline of Aprista Influence in Student and Labor Movements

The PAP's current problems and prospects are not restricted to internal unity, leadership changes, the animosity of the armed forces, and the new challenge of the

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non-Communist left. Since 1956 it has faced related Communist and non-Communist threats to its control of traditional strongholds among organized labor and students. The protracted battle with the Communists in these two areas is not new, but the Communists have found new Aprista enemies with which to cooperate.

Both the PDC and the AP are bitter enemies of the PAP and apparently view Aprismo as a greater political threat than Communism. Their willingness to work with the Communists is an important factor contributing to the weakening of Aprista influence in the student and labor fields -- a decline which may be a kind of barometer of the PAP's political future.

Apristas lost their domination of the university student movement after 1956 and have not been able to recoup their losses. They were even defeated in student elections at the University of Trujillo, an Aprista stronghold, for a brief period in the early 1960's. Although there is some evidence of a reversal of Communist control in the past two years and of a Moscow-Peking split within Communist student ranks, future Aprista victories at the university elections will probably be won only through compromising deals with the student leaders representing other political parties.

The PAP has controlled Peru's principal labor organization, the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP), since the year after its founding in 1944. It still monopolizes the leadership of the CTP, but the locus of power for political action rests primarily in the affiliated federations and individual unions, several of which are under Communist or pro-Communist leaders. During the past decade, both the PDC and the AP have also developed an organized labor following which has tended to dilute the PAP's position. Thus, organized labor is an even less reliable political action arm of the party today than it has been in the past.

In part the decline of Aprista influence in organized labor reflects the PAP's attempts to exploit this mass element to back party political objectives, rather than to support the CTP as a conventional labor organization. General strike attempts, dictated by the PAP and carried out by the CTP since the 1940's, have usually been failures, detracting from the prestige of the party as well as that of labor. Since mid-1965, the CTP has displayed a degree

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of independence from party control, refusing unqualified support of the Aprista position on certain issues. PAP leaders have also reportedly agreed to requests from the Aprista directors of the confederation for greater freedom from party directives. These adjustments, if respected in practice, could prove mutually beneficial to the party and the confederation.

The decline of Aprista influence over both students and labor will probably not be reversed without a re-orientation of the party's program and a change in its leadership. The weakness in these Aprista strongholds is difficult to measure in terms of impact on voting strength, but may in part foreshadow a critical period in the party's history.

The Dilemma of the PAP and Aprismo

The PAP today holds many strong political assets and advantages vis-a-vis its competition, inter alia: organization, discipline, tradition, and programs. As noted, it also will probably retain unity as long as Haya stays on the scene.

But many of these assets may also be considered among the party's heaviest liabilities. The PAP cannot seem to erase the facts, myths, and distortions connected with its violent and checkered history. Many still view Aprismo as a kind of subversive, unpatriotic, international conspiracy. Haya and the old-line leaders are still anathemas to the military and powerful rightist elements, and the passage of time has done little to change this.

Until freed of the old guard, the PAP's prospects for winning executive power show only limited potential for improvement over past experience. Moreover, the monopoly of the mature Aprista leaders has no doubt discouraged not only development of younger replacements but has seriously inhibited the construction of a fresh façade for the party's programs. In addition, Haya's concentration on his international stature and the Aprismo concept of unity for the hemisphere have probably been a detriment to the PAP, dissipating its energies and leaving it open to charges that it is not a true, patriotic, national organization. In this sense, Aprismo has clashed with the strongest force in Latin America during the years

since the PAP was founded--the force of nationalism, raw, violent, and often irrational.

In still another way, the PAP has gone against the political trend in Peru as well as in less conservative countries of Latin America. Many centrist and leftist parties have turned increasingly to more radical programs and promises of "fundamental reforms," "destruction of privilege," "social justice," and similar planks in order to appeal to the expanding electorate. Nationalistic issues, promises for expropriation of foreign assets, US-baiting, advocacy of extensive relations with Communist bloc countries, expansion of state enterprises, and various welfare measures are some of the principal themes stressed in these political campaigns. In contrast, the PAP has moved back from the far left toward the center in the past two decades, muting, moderating, or even dropping such extremist attractions from its programs. In the view of youth, intellectuals, and other radical elements, the PAP and Aprismo apparently are becoming somewhat faded and shopworn, in addition to being perennial losers.

Certain identifiable contingencies would undoubtedly enhance the PAP's relatively strong position. These include: the disintegration of the AP at the close of Belaúnde's term of office; the departure of Haya along with the emergence of new Aprista leaders with national stature; the rejuvenation of the party program; and, perhaps most important, the adoption of a true apolitical attitude on the part of the armed forces, comprehending an Aprista electoral victory. The PAP will have to make positive and concerted efforts to encourage all but the first of these contingencies. At present, however, there is little indication that the party is planning or adopting measures to bring about such results.

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